Nov 8, 2017 in Book Report

British Laws

According to Jacques Alcan, mimicry discloses unspecified thing that is far from being distinct.  This book tries to analyze how the source of policy for British colonial empires is a mimic representation of the British Laws.

The conversation or speeches used by colonies that were ruled by the English colonialist are often spoken in a forked tongue. Colonialism continuously exercises its power through symbols or forms of ridiculous shams, by taking control in the name of history. In order to define the poetic purpose of the civilizing mission, “human and partially human”, the famous word of Lord Roseberry states that “written by Divines’ finger” usually produces a text that is rich in the repetition or mimicry traditions (Bhabha, 1984). A turn from such high imagination of colonialism to its less effective mimetic literary in this comic makes mimicry to emerge as one of the most  skillfully evasive and functioning strategies that formed the basis for colonial knowledge and power.

Edward Said describes the conflicting economy on the colonial speech as the struggle between identity demand and the pressure of the historical change. For effectiveness of mimicry, upshots of slippage, degrees of unlikeliest and extremetity should exist, so the mimicry discourse is made around a fluctuation. Thus mimicry is a symbol of double formation: a reform strategy that is difficult, a law which “fits” the other as power is visualized by the it. Mimicry can also be the symbol that does not fit, but also a difference that connects the governing strategic use of colonial power and poses threat to both knowledge and disciplinary powers that are “normalized”.

Mimicry has an effect on the power to determine in the colonial discourse in which it can be trouble and intense. In the process of “normalizing” the state of colonialism, the civility in the post-Enlightenment has its own liberty language and the facts about its norms. This uncertainty often enlightens us that the strategy can be distinguishable. An example can be found in Locke’s Second Treatise which divides to disclose the disadvantages of liberty in his use of the word “slave” twice. He describes the slave word in his first description as a form of legal ownership and the second description as an illegal misuse of power. The difference in the two uses is articulated to the unseen dissimilarity between the “Colonial” Carolina state and the original State of Nature (Bhabha, 1984).

The area connecting mockery and mimicry threatens the improving mission which is civilizing through displacing of its displinary double gaze, which many occurrences of colonial resemblance may come. Mimicry and Mockery share an argumentive process in which the extreme slippage that is produced by the fluctuations in mimicry does not entirely “damage” the discourse but is turned into an unambiguity that fixes the topic on colonialism as a presence that is “partial”.

Bhabha (1984) observes that Charles Grant’s “observation on the state of society among the Asiatic subjects of Great Britain” shows a classic text that has such partiality. Grant had a dream of a system of evangelical mission of education. This mission was conducted in English and was not wholly a political reform belief along line of Christianity, and also partly a way of alerting the company rule in India that was expanding, in that the company rule required manners that were reformed. This “interpellation” was meant to provide “a sense of personal identity” and it is this “partial” discursiveness and “partial” power on moral reformations that forms the basis for construction of an appropriate method of colonial subjectivity. The suggestion made is there should be a process of reform improvement where Christian teachings might be combined with segregated practices of the caste system to prevent harmful political alliances. According to Grant, Christianity is a method of social control and it conflicts with the pronounced assumptions that govern his discourse. Grant also mimics his moral project and breaks the Christianity Evidences that prohibits the endurance of heathen faiths.

The figure of mimicry can be observed where Anderson illustrates as the “when the inside of a nation and empire cannot be joined together”. It gives problems on the symbols of racial and cultural rights, such that the “Citizen” is no longer naturalizable. Writing, which is a method of representation comes out between mimicry and mimesis, marginalizes the history monumentality and simply mimics its authority to be a figure.  Mimicry is not re-presented and less significant view grows the Decoud’s displaced European vision of Sulaco as “civil strife that is endless where it seemed harder for the folly to bear than its disgrace.

According to Bhabha (1984), mimicry can not be the commonly known exercise of a colonial that has dependent relations by the act of narcissistic recognition. Mimicry does not cover up any existence at its mask’s back: never shall it be what C’esaire calls “colonialization thingification” in which the presence Africanize essence stands behind it. Mimicry menace is its twice as large vision which not only discloses the fluctuations of colonial discourse but also disrupts its power to control. This twice as large vision is as a result of representation of the colonial subject partially.

“The appropriate objects of a chain of command by the colony are seen in the partial mimic by Grants colonial, translator by Macaulay, play-actor of the colonial politician by Naipaul and Decoud which is seen as the scene setter”, (Bhabha 1984). These are also doubling figures, part objects of colonial desire metonymy which takes away the modality of the discourses that are dominant and emerge as colonial subjects that are “inappropriate”. The partial presence repetition forms a desire which becomes a basis of mimicry. This desire reserves partially the appropriation of colonial by causing a vision partially of the presence of the colonizer. Bhabha turns to the process where surveillance look comes back as the disciplined gaze that is displaced. In this process, the observer turns out to be the observed and there is there is a rearticulation of the “partial’ representation to a whole identity notion.

For mimicry to be visible, it has to be produced at the interdiction site. Mimicry is usually a colonial discourse form where at the crossroads the permissible and what is known are concealed. The desire for mimicry of the colonial may miss an object but has objectives which are strategic and Bhabha describes them as metonymy of presence. There are strategies that are desirable in discourse and they make a representation of colonized object that is anomalous. The metonymy instances are productions of beliefs that are contradictory or multiple and they are non repressive (Bhabha, 1984). 

In mimicry, identity representations and meanings are uttered clearly along the metonymy axis. Mimicry threats comes from a strategic creation of “identity effects” that is conflictual and discriminatory (Bhabha, 1984). Mimicry, as metonymy of presence is a strategy of power in colonial discourse which is erratic and eccentric. It does not merely extinguish narcissistic power to influence through the differentiated and desirable slippage that is repeated.  It is a continuous action of the colonial fixation as a cross-classificatory knowledge in the defiles of pertaining to the discourse. This therefore raises the question of the power to influence in the colonial representation.

Mimicry, like the fetish, is an object that is not whole and it usually reestimates knowledges of race priorities that are normative, under the camouflage cover. Just like the fetish mines where it deauthorises the forms of authority, mimicry rearticulates presence in forms of disavowed “others”.

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